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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Rodney Tyger, Shawn Wadsworth, and approximately 1,000 
opt-in Plaintiffs brought a collective action against Defendants Precision Drilling Corp., 
Precision Drilling Oilfield Services, Inc., and Precision Drilling Company, LP (together, 
“Precision”) for failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.  On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the District 
Court’s denial of their motion for partial summary judgment and grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Precision.  In addition, Plaintiffs appeal the District Court’s order 
excluding Plaintiffs’ proposed expert under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993).  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand 
for further proceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND1 
Plaintiffs are current and former Precision employees who have worked as rig 
hands on Precision oil and gas drilling rigs.  They filed this collective action seeking 
damages under the FLSA for Precision’s failure to pay them for, inter alia,  (1) pre-shift 
donning and post-shift doffing of certain personal protective equipment (“PPE”) and (2) 
the associated time spent walking and waiting after donning and before doffing.2  It is not 
disputed that Precision failed to pay for those activities.  Rather, the central question in 
 
1 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and 
procedural posture to date, we recite only those facts necessary to our analysis.   
2 Plaintiffs initially asserted a third claim—for failure to pay for time spent attending 




this case is whether donning and doffing the PPE at issue is compensable under the 
FLSA. 
Pursuant to both Precision’s policies and the relevant Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (“OSHA”) regulations,3 Plaintiffs are required to wear various 
forms of basic PPE while operating oil rigs, including flame-retardant coveralls, steel-
toed boots, gloves, goggles, hardhats, and earplugs (“basic PPE”).  This basic PPE is 
worn to avoid common hazards at the worksite, such as electrical shock, falling objects, 
flying debris, slippery surfaces, and chemical exposure.4  It is undisputed that, in the 
course of rig hands’ work drilling oil and gas wells, their basic PPE becomes covered 
with drilling mud, grease, lubricants, and caustic chemicals, and that the basic PPE 
reduces the risk of exposure to those substances.   
With respect to the issue of chemical exposure, Plaintiffs offered the report and 
testimony of proposed chemical hygiene expert Dr. Ronald Bishop, Ph.D., CHO.  Dr. 
Bishop opined on the health risks associated with exposure to certain hazardous materials 
on the rigs, in addition to the benefits of wearing PPE.   
After the close of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary 
judgment.  The District Court initially granted Precision’s motion only with respect to 
 
3 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 (mandating PPE “wherever it is necessary by reason of 
hazards of processes or environment, chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or 
mechanical irritants encountered in a manner capable of causing injury or impairment in 
the function of any part of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical contact”). 
4 Certain tasks on Precision oil rigs require additional, specialized PPE such as rubber 
aprons, disposable Tyvek suits, rubber gloves, face shields, and respirators to protect 
against increased chemical exposure.  Time spent donning and doffing that additional, 




Plaintiffs’ claim that Precision’s failure to pay for donning and doffing was a willful 
violation of the FLSA—an issue bearing on the applicable statute of limitations.  The 
District Court denied Precision’s motion in all other respects and denied Plaintiffs’ 
motion in full.  In so ruling, the District Court found a genuine dispute of material fact 
with respect to whether donning and doffing the basic PPE was an “integral and 
indispensable”—and therefore compensable—part of Plaintiff’s principal activities as rig 
hands.  Specifically, the District Court determined that factual issues remained regarding 
“the harmful nature of the drilling mud and other chemicals which are commonplace in 
Plaintiffs’ principal duties.”  App. 46.   
Precision later filed a Daubert motion to exclude the report and testimony of Dr. 
Bishop.  Finding Dr. Bishop’s proffered opinions unreliable, the District Court granted 
the Daubert motion and ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why, given the exclusion of Dr. 
Bishop, summary judgment should not be granted for Precision on Plaintiffs’ overtime 
claims.  The District Court concluded that, absent expert testimony, Plaintiffs failed to 
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether donning and doffing was 
compensable under the FLSA, and granted summary judgment on the overtime claims in 
favor of Precision.  Plaintiffs timely appealed.  
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1291 to review the District Court’s final order.   
We review a district court’s decision to exclude expert testimony for abuse of 




ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is “arbitrary, fanciful or clearly 
unreasonable,” and “[w]e will not disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion unless no 
reasonable person would adopt the district court’s view.”  Ansell v. Green Acres 
Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant or deny summary judgment.  Tundo 
v. City of Passaic, 923 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2019).   
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs raise three issues on appeal.  First, they challenge the District Court’s 
exclusion of Dr. Bishop’s expert report and testimony.  Second, Plaintiffs argue that the 
District Court erred in concluding as a matter of law that, given the absence of expert 
testimony, donning and doffing was not integral and indispensable to their principal 
activities as rig hands.  Third, Plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment on the issue of Precision’s willfulness.  We disagree with Plaintiffs 
on the first and third issues but agree with them on the second issue.  We address each 
argument in turn. 
A. Exclusion of Dr. Bishop’s Expert Report and Testimony 
Plaintiffs first contend that the District Court abused its discretion in excluding the 
report and testimony of Dr. Bishop under Federal Rule of Evidence 7025 and Daubert.  
 
5 Rule 702 provides:  
 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help 




Pursuant to Daubert and its progeny, district court judges have a “gatekeeping” 
obligation to insure that only reliable and relevant expert testimony be presented to 
jurors.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.  In this role, district courts must ensure that expert 
testimony satisfies a “trilogy of restrictions”: qualification, reliability, and fit.  Schneider 
ex rel. Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2013).  The overriding 
consideration with regard to these three requirements is that expert testimony should be 
admitted if it will assist the trier of fact.  See United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 850 
(3d Cir. 1995).   
The reliability prong is at issue in this case.  To be reliable, an expert opinion must 
“be based on the ‘methods and procedures of science’ rather than on ‘subjective belief or 
unsupported speculation.’” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3d Cir. 
1994) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).  While a party need not “demonstrate to the 
judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of [its] experts are 
correct,” the expert must nonetheless “have ‘good grounds’ for his or her belief.”  Id. at 
742, 744.  This test of reliability is “flexible,” and the trial court exercises “broad 
latitude” in determining how to assess the reliability of an expert opinion.  Kumho Tire 
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141–42 (1999). 
In this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the 
 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the 
product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
 




opinions of Dr. Bishop were unreliable.  Dr. Bishop offered four main opinions: (1) that 
hazardous materials are present in Precision “drilling fluids, materials encountered in 
rock formations . . . , and the products of chemical or physical reactions between drilling 
fluid components and compounds in produced cuttings and fluids”; (2) that PPE6 
provides protection from direct exposure to those hazardous materials; (3) that in the 
course of Plaintiffs’ work, their PPE becomes contaminated with hazardous materials; 
and (4) that it would be unsafe to doff soiled PPE off the worksite.  Dr. Bishop 
specifically identified glycol ethers and radioactive material as two hazardous substances 
present in Plaintiffs’ work environment.  By underscoring the chemical safety hazards of 
oil drilling, the importance of wearing PPE, and the need for Precision employees to 
change their PPE on the worksite, Dr. Bishop’s report and testimony would bolster 
Plaintiffs’ claim that donning and doffing is integral and indispensable to their work, and 
therefore compensable under the FLSA.   
The parties in this case dispute the magnitude of the chemical safety hazards 
identified by Dr. Bishop.  As the District Court correctly pointed out, however, Dr. 
Bishop lacked quantitative data on the levels of Plaintiffs’ exposure to glycol ethers, 
radioactive materials, or any other hazardous substances present on the Precision 
worksite.  The District Court determined that without exposure data, Dr. Bishop’s 
opinions on the chemical hazards faced by Plaintiffs, and critically, the importance of 
wearing and doffing PPE on-site, lacked good grounds.  That conclusion was not 
 
6 We note that Dr. Bishop’s report does not distinguish between the basic PPE at issue in 




unreasonable.7  See, e.g., Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 156 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“Daubert . . .  require[s] more than [a] haphazard, intuitive inquiry.”); Elcock v. 
Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 755 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that an expert opinion overly 
reliant on assumptions absent “sufficient factual predicates” is a “castle made of sand”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
Accordingly, in light of the latitude afforded the District Court under the abuse of 
discretion standard, we will not disturb the District Court’s exclusion of Dr. Bishop’s 
report and testimony. 
B. Whether Donning and Doffing is Integral and Indispensable 
 
We turn next to the parties’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment and the 
District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Precision.  Summary judgment is 
appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Montone v. Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013); 
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
Plaintiffs urge that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor 
of Precision because the District Court concluded that, without expert testimony, 
Plaintiffs could not prove that donning and doffing the basic PPE was integral and 
 
7 Plaintiffs submitted a supplemental declaration by Dr. Bishop approximately two years 
after the submission of his original report.  Precision argues that the report is untimely 
and should therefore be excluded.  Like the District Court, we need not address that 
argument because Dr. Bishop’s supplemental declaration, which also lacks any reference 




indispensable to their work drilling oil and gas wells.  Plaintiffs contend that even 
without an expert opinion regarding chemical exposure, they have presented other 
evidence that donning and doffing was nonetheless integral8 and indispensable as a 
matter of law, or at a minimum, that genuine issues of fact preclude summary judgment 
in favor of Precision on this issue.   
The FLSA generally requires that employers pay overtime wages to employees 
who work over 40 hours in a workweek.  See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  However, the 
Portal-to-Portal Act provides two exceptions to this FLSA-mandated compensation: (1) 
for traveling to or from the “place of performance of the principal activity or activities 
which such employee is employed to perform”; and (2) for “activities which are 
preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities.”  29 U.S.C. § 254(a).  
The Supreme Court has held that “principal activities” encompass “all activities which 
are an ‘integral and indispensable part of the principal activities.’”  Integrity Staffing 
Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 33 (2014) (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 
29–30 (2005)).  Thus, for donning and doffing the basic PPE in this case to be 
compensable under the FLSA—and not merely a preliminary or postliminary activity—it 
must be an integral and indispensable part of Plaintiffs’ work as rig hands.  See id.9   
 
8 According to Plaintiffs, the District Court has already concluded as a matter of law that 
donning and doffing was integral to their principal activities and only granted summary 
judgment in favor of Precision on the question of indispensability.  We reject that 
characterization of the District Court’s decision.  The District Court did not determine as 
a matter of law that donning and doffing was an integral part of Plaintiffs’ work as rig 
hands.  
9 With respect to Plaintiffs’ second overtime claim, the parties agree that, pursuant to the 




To demonstrate that an activity is integral and indispensable to a principal activity, 
a plaintiff must establish that “it is an intrinsic element of those [principal] activities and 
one with which the employee cannot dispense if he is to perform his principal activities.”  
Busk, 574 U.S. at 32–33.  The analysis of this concept across various work settings is 
inherently flexible and context-specific.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S. 
260, 263 (1956) (determining that sharpening knives is integral and indispensable to the 
work of meat packing employees); Perez v. City of New York, 832 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 
2016) (considering whether the donning and doffing of bulletproof vests is integral and 
indispensable to the work of urban park rangers).   
In evaluating whether the donning and doffing of PPE in this case qualified as 
integral and indispensable, the District Court adopted the inquiry set forth by the Second 
Circuit, mainly, whether “the gear . . . guards against ‘workplace dangers’ that 
accompany the employee’s principal activities and ‘transcend ordinary risks.’” Perez, 832 
F.3d at 127 (quoting Gorman v. Consol. Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 593 (2d Cir. 2007)).  
But the District Court then focused on the toxic chemicals in Plaintiffs’ work 
environment, and specifically, the level of toxicity, which, it concluded, presented a 
genuine issue of material fact.  Citing Dr. Bishop’s report and testimony, the District 
 
walking and waiting time is compensable only if donning and doffing is also 
compensable.  See 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b) (generally defining the “workday” as “the period 
between the commencement and completion on the same workday of an employee’s 
principal activity or activities”); Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 37 (“Moreover, during a continuous 
workday, any walking time that occurs after the beginning of the employee’s first 
principal activity and before the end of the employee's last principal activity . . . is 
covered by the FLSA.”).  As such, the crux of the parties’ dispute is whether donning and 




Court initially concluded that factual disputes regarding the “harmful nature of the 
drilling mud and other chemicals which are commonplace in Plaintiffs’ principal duties” 
and “the level of chemical toxicity to which Plaintiffs are exposed” precluded summary 
judgment in favor of either party.  App. 46, 49. 
After excluding Dr. Bishop’s opinions, the District Court incorrectly determined 
that—absent Dr. Bishop’s expert testimony regarding toxicity—Plaintiffs could not prove 
that Precision rig hands’ work was sufficiently hazardous.  Significantly, we have 
identified no FLSA case in the donning and doffing context that requires plaintiffs to 
provide an expert opinion on workplace safety risks or the protective value of their PPE 
in order to meet the integral and indispensable standard.  
The District Court further erred by analogizing this case to toxic tort actions, 
which often require plaintiffs to produce expert testimony on their chemical exposure.  
See App. 6 (citing N’Jai v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 705 F. App’x 126, 128 (3d Cir. 
2017); McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Grp., Inc., 869 F.3d 246, 251, 
267 (3d Cir. 2017); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of Army of U.S., 55 F.3d 827, 845 
(3d Cir. 1995)).  Such cases are clearly distinguishable from this case.  Unlike in the toxic 
tort context, the FLSA integral and indispensable inquiry does not require that Plaintiffs 
establish a causal link between occupational hazards and medical harm.  See, e.g., In re 
TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 626–27 (3d Cir. 1999), amended, 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(noting plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate chemical exposure and causation).  
 We therefore conclude that a plaintiff may attempt to satisfy the integral and 




concerning worksite safety risks and the nature of the job and PPE at issue—evidence 
which Plaintiffs have produced in this case.  See, e.g., Busk, 574 U.S. at 36 (holding that 
“[t]he integral and indispensable test is tied to the productive work that the employee is 
employed to perform”) (emphasis omitted); Perez, 832 F.3d at 127 (“This inquiry 
requires a fact-intensive examination of the gear at issue, the employee’s principal 
activities, and the relationship between them.”).  Thus, while expert testimony as to the 
levels of Plaintiffs’ chemical exposure would certainly support Plaintiffs’ case, see 
Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 249 (1956), such evidence is not required as a matter of 
law.  
Because the District Court improperly determined that expert testimony was 
necessary in this case, the District Court never reached the issue of whether, based on the 
other evidence presented by Plaintiffs, donning and doffing the basic PPE was integral 
and indispensable to Plaintiffs’ work.  Thus, we will not address this question but will 
vacate that part of the District Court order granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ 
overtime claims and remand10 for further proceedings.11   
 
10 We note that the question of whether donning and doffing is integral and indispensable 
to Plaintiffs’ principal activities may be susceptible to determination by the District Court 
as a matter of law or may be more properly left for the jury.  Compare Perez, 832 F.3d at 
125 (holding “that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the plaintiffs’ donning and 
doffing of uniforms are integral and indispensable to their principal activities”), with 
Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 620 (6th Cir. 2010) (determining the integral and 
indispensable question as a matter of law). 
11 We do not address two other arguments advanced by Precision, namely that donning 
and doffing is not compensable under the Department of Labor’s so-called “change-at-
home” rule, 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c), and that a factual dispute remains as to whether any 
time spent donning and doffing was de minimis.  The District Court did not address the 




C. Willful Violation of the FLSA 
Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court erred in concluding that there were no 
genuine issues of fact regarding whether Precision’s failure to pay for donning and 
doffing was a willful violation of the FLSA.  Under the FLSA, willful violations are 
entitled to a three-year statute of limitations, while non-willful violations are entitled to 
only a two-year limitations period.  29 U.S.C. § 255(a).12 A FLSA violation is willful 
when the employer “either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether 
its conduct was prohibited.”  McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 
(1988).  However, willfulness “does not require a showing of egregiousness.”  Stone v. 
Troy Constr., LLC, 935 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2019). 
The District Court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact as to 
whether Precision’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the FLSA.  As the District 
Court stated, Plaintiffs have failed to adduce any evidence that Precision “either knew or 
suspected that their practices were violative of the FLSA or recklessly disregarded the 
possibility of same.”  App. 52.  It relied in part on the paucity of Third Circuit precedent 
that would inform Precision that donning and doffing was integral and indispensable in 
this context.  See Perez v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 650 F.3d 350, 375 (4th Cir. 2011) 
 
12 The applicable statute of limitations is particularly significant in FLSA collective 
actions because, unlike with class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, an 
individual plaintiff’s claim is not considered “commenced” until he opts into the lawsuit.  
See 29 U.S.C. § 256(b); see also Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 
200 (3d Cir. 2011) (distinguishing FLSA collective actions from Rule 23 class actions).  
As such, a shorter statute of limitations may limit the number of opt-in Plaintiffs able to 




(noting the lack of “binding [Fourth Circuit] authority directly addressing the issue of 
compensation for the donning and doffing of protective gear” in reviewing the district 
court’s finding with respect to willfulness); Reich v. Gateway Press, Inc., 13 F.3d 685, 
702–03 (3d Cir. 1994).  Plaintiffs urge that Precision purported to have a policy whereby 
its employees were permitted to change out of PPE at home but that this policy was 
“illusory.”  But that evidence alone is not persuasive regarding Precision’s awareness or 
reckless disregard of its obligations under the FLSA and is thus insufficient to defeat 
Precision’s motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ willful violation claim. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling that there was no genuine 
factual dispute as to whether Precision’s failure to pay for donning and doffing was a 
willful FLSA violation.  Summary judgment on this issue was properly granted in favor 
of Precision. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s exclusion of Dr. 
Bishop’s expert report and testimony and grant of summary judgment with respect to the 
issue of Precision’s willfulness and the applicable statute of limitations.  We will vacate 
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Precision in all other respects 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
